German OWASP Day 2025

THE TRUST TRAP
Security of Coding Assistants

Clemens Hübner

Success Story Code AI

92% of US developers use AI coding tools daily, with 82% of global developers using them at least weekly

Almost half of code is written with the use of AI, representing **256 billion lines**

$4.7b $ global market for vibe coding platforms, projected to reach $12.3 billion by 2027

(2025), Source

Success Story Code AI?

How MCP Gateways Can Mitigate Hidden MCP Security Risks

Published Nov 20, 2025, 07:00am EST

PROMPT INJECTION TRICKS AI INTO DOWNLOADING AND EXECUTING MALWARE

by: Donald Papp January 26, 2025

Johann Rehberger ✓ ···
@wunderwuzzi23

🚨 Google AI Studio continues to struggle with data exfiltration vulnerabilities ⚠️

Black Hat: Researchers demonstrate zero-click prompt injection attacks in popular AI agents

News
Aug 8, 2025 • 8 mins

ChatGPT Operator: Prompt Injection Exploits & Defenses

Posted on Feb 17, 2025

Vibe Coding Fiasco: AI Agent Goes Rogue, Deletes Company's Entire Database

July 22, 2025

German OWASP Day 2025

Clemens Hübner

Tech Lead Software Security

inovex, Munich

Developer, Consultant, Speaker, Trainer

@ClemensHuebner

clemens.huebner@inovex.de

@clemens@infosec.exchange

/clemens-huebner

@inovexlife

blog.inovex.de

inovex

German OWASP Day 2025

1) The Rise of Code AI


Andrej Karpathy
@karpathy
There's a new kind of coding I call "vibe coding", where you fully give in to the vibes, embrace exponentials, and forget that the code even exists. It's possible because the LLMs (e.g. Cursor Composer w Sonnet) are getting too good. Also I just talk to Composer with SuperWhisper so I barely even touch the keyboard. I ask for the dumbest things like "decrease the padding on the sidebar by half" because I'm too lazy to find it. I "Accept All" always, I don't read the diffs anymore. When I get error messages I just copy paste them in with no comment, usually that fixes it. The code grows beyond my usual comprehension, I'd have to really read through it for a while. Sometimes the LLMs can't fix a bug so I just work around it or ask for random changes until it goes away. It's not too bad for throwaway weekend projects, but still quite amusing. I'm building a project or webapp, but it's not really coding - I just see stuff, say stuff, run stuff, and copy paste stuff, and it mostly works.
6:17 PM · Feb 2, 2025 · 4M Views
1.2K
3.9K
24K
12K

I: current line
O: next line(s)

Autocompletion

e.g. Tabnine, IntelliSense,

predicting

I: question
O: code to copy

Q&A-Helper

e.g. ChatGPT

conversational

I: prompt & context
O: code snippets

RAG-based assistants

e.g. Copilot Chat

contextual

I: prompt & tool
O: code changes

Coding Agents

e.g. Cursor Composer, Windsurf

agentic

I: natural language
O: whole app

Vibe Coding Agents

e.g. Replit, Bolt

vibing

German OWASP Day 2025

2) The Security of Coding Assistants


Tools
Coding Assistant
System Prompt
Prompt
LLM
User Prompt
Context
Training Data
Code changes
Command executions
Test, Build, Run, Commit, Push

OWASP's take on Code AI Security?

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025

LLM01 - Prompt injection

Direct prompt injection

- attacker manipulates LLM directly through prompt
  e.g. through user input, rules files, requirements

Indirect prompt injection

- manipulation of used context
  e.g. code in other file, comment in 3rd party lib,

Rules File Backdoor

Rules file:

- preprompts for coding assistants
- broadly shared
- end in context window for each LLM run



Source

XOXO: Stealthy Cross-Origin Context Poisoning Attacks against AI Coding Assistants



Source

MCP Server: Prompt injection as a service?

- MCP server create a convenient ecosystem
- connected MCP server can easily tamper with the context (even if not called)
- MCP server have to be trusted



The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025

LLM02 - Sensitive Information Disclosure

Code AI has access to sensitive information

- in code base
  e.g. API keys, configuration secrets, IP
- on the developer's machine
  e.g. ssh keys, credentials
- in the repository
  e.g. secrets, other code

Camoleak

Vulnerability in Github Copilot Chat:

- attackers used invisible comments in PRs
- Review agent runs with user rights
- access to private repos and secrets

Extraction needed?
→ LLM05!



Source

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025

LLM03 - Supply Chain

- Code AI is part of the supply chain itself
  - so are the LLMs
    - blackbox, impossible to audit
    - constantly changing, not reproducible

- Code AI has influence on supply chain of the project
  - selecting dependencies
  - hallucinating package names

Slopsquatting



Slopsquatting

Can you trust ChatGPT's package recommendations?

Bar Lanyado | June 06, 2023



Source

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM04 - Data and Model Poisoning

Model Poisoning

- manipulate weights in downloadable models

Data Poisoning

- through training data
- public datasets, open source code, support websites
- insecure implementations, trojan backdoors,

Agent Poisoning

- SEO poisoning for agents

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM05 - Improper Output Handling

- for extraction of discovered secrets or sensitive data
  - easy: agents with open web access
  - alternatively:
    - leverage other tools
    - Markdown image exfiltration
    - indirect through deployed code
- for misuse of tools
  - SQL queries → DB manipulation
  - shell commands → RCE
  - → excessive agency

Camoleak

Exfiltration of secrets:

- usage of markdown images
- bypassing CSP through Github's own image service



Source

The lethal trifecta



Source

The lethal trifecta



Source

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM06 - Excessive Agency

Agent:

LLM with a goal

+ planning capabilities

+ tool access

Confused deputy attacks on tools through prompt injection

Shell

Code Interpreter

File System

Web Search

Logs

Version Control

Issue Tracker

Analysis Tools

Database

Unintentionally excessive Agency: Replit

Vibe coding service Replit deleted user's production database, faked data, told fibs galore

Simon Sharwood

Mon 21 Jul 2025 / 02:30 UTC

Source

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM07 - System Prompt Leakage

- System prompt of agent might be leaked to user
  → no real code security issue

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM08 - Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

- Code assistants store additional context in vector databases
- Embedded external data might be poisoned
- Attacker can manipulate embeddings to prioritize their files

Source

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM09 - Misinformation

Misinformation of code assistants

=

unintentionally insecure code

The quality of AI generated code



Source

"Comprehension Debt"


Code Operations and Code Churn by Year
Projection
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
3.05%
3.27%
3.31%
4.50%
5.67%
6.87%
Added
Deleted
Updated
Moved
Copy/pasted
Find/replaced
Churn
GitClear Code Quality Research 2025
Relative distribution of code operations by year of authorship
GitClear AI Code Quality Research v2025.2.5

Source



Evaluation of LLMs by Veracode (Source)

- 45% of code samples failed security tests and introduced OWASP Top 10 security vulnerabilities into the code
- Weaknesses introduced were standard, common weaknesses like XSS
- Newer models are not better than older; no increase in security visible

Benchmarking the security of Code AI



BAXBENCH: Can LLMs Generate Correct and Secure Backends?

Mark Vero [1] Niels Mündler [1] Victor Chibotaru [2] Veselin Raychev [2] Maximilian Baader [1] Nikola Jovanović [1]
Jingxuan He [3] Martin Vechev [1 4]

05/2025, Source

- 62% of the solutions generated even by the best model are either incorrect or contain a security vulnerability
- On average, around half of the correct solutions are insecure



BaxBench Leaderboard

No Security Reminder | Generic Security Reminder | Oracle Security Reminder

Rank	Model	Correct & Secure ↓	Correct	% Insecure of Correct
1 (+2)	Claude 4 Sonnet Thinking	50.5%	66.8%	24.4%
2 (-1)	GPT-5	46.7%	55.6%	16.1%
3 (+2)	Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking	45.2%	59.7%	24.4%
4 (+2)	OpenAI o3-mini	43.1%	59.4%	27.5%
5 (+6)	OpenAI o1	42.6%	62.8%	32.1%
6 (-4)	OpenAI o3	41.3%	50.5%	18.2%
7 (+2)	Grok 4	41.1%	53.3%	23.0%
8 (-1)	DeepSeek R1	39.0%	51.8%	24.6%
9 (-1)	Claude 3.5 Sonnet	35.7%	47.7%	25.1%
10 (-6)	GPT-4.1	34.3%	42.8%	19.7%

11/2025, Source

The geopolitical aspect of code assistants



DeepSeek injects 50% more security bugs when prompted with Chinese political triggers

Louis Columbus

November 24, 2025

Source, primary study

Taxonomy of AI-introduced flaws

Happy Path Bias

- focus on functionality
- missing security controls (authz, rate limiting, error handling,...)

Learned Insecurity

- legacy patterns: algorithms, ciphers, libs, versions
- hardcoded secrets
- “Stack Overflow Effect”

Architectural Blindness

- ignoring broader architecture
- missing understanding of trust model
- logical flaws

Hallucination Based

- wrong api usage, leading to missing security features
- slopsquatting

The Trust Trap



Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?

Neil Perry* Stanford University
Megha Srivastava* Stanford University
Deepak Kumar Stanford University / UC San Diego
Dan Boneh Stanford University

12/2023, Source

"Participants who had access to the AI assistant were **more likely to introduce security vulnerabilities** for the majority of programming tasks, yet were also more likely to **rate their insecure answers as secure** compared to those in our control group."

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025



LLM10 - Unbound Consumption

... relevant if code assistant is charged by usage

3) Countermeasures

Countermeasures



only partial mitigation possible

through careful designed limitiations

by conventional countermeasures

Only partial mitigation possible



Prompt injection

- through detection effort
- context highlighting, spotlighting

Data and Model poisoning

- reviews on output

System prompt leakage

- accept!

Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

- hard to prevent, but only secondary

Through careful designed limitiations

Sensitive Data Disclosure

- tend to accept, focus on output control (see below)
- permission design

Improper Output Handling

- thou

Excessive Agency

- thorough permission design
- limitations in tool usage
- HITL
- MCP might help

Unbound consumption

- rate limiting, budget control

By conventional countermeasures

Supply Chain

- analog to securing a conventional software supply chain
- risk of model itself stays!

Misinformation

- secure development processes
- responsible, critical use of coding AI

- Responsible usage
  - Consider implementing core-security features yourself

- Prompt Engineering for Security
  - Security reminder
  - Explicitly name possible weaknesses

- Secure configuration and operation



- Review
  - The more automated the generation, the more manual the review must be
  - Independent from coding assistant (and used LLM)

- Design & Processes
  - Threat Modeling
  - Define trust boundaries, develop coding & review standards

- Tests
  - SCA (Software composition analysis)
  - SAST (Static Application Security Tests)
  - Misuse Cases

- Education & Awareness

Countermeasures



only partial mitigation possible

through careful designed limitiations

by conventional countermeasures

Additional resources



[Security-Focused Guide for AI Code Assistant Instructions]



[OWASP GenAI Security Project]

OWASP's take on Code AI Security?

5 Layers of Secure Coding Agents

Governance and Processes

Data and Tool Access

Foundation Model



Prompting and Reviewing

Agent Framework

THANK YOU!

German OWASP Day 2025

QUESTIONS?



Clemens Hübner

Tech Lead Software Security

/clemens-huebner

@clemens@infosec.exchange

clemens.huebner@inovex.de


German
OWASP
Day 2025